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*
  he EU’s financial sector has been undergoing an almost continuous wave of de- or re-
regulation since the late 1980s. The Single Market programme with minimal
harmonisation and home country control was implemented in successive periods for
banking, insurance and the securities markets. By the end of the 1990s, however, under the
impact of EMU, it was clear that this was not sufficient, and a Financial Services Action
Programme set a schedule for the adoption of 42 directives to create a truly integrated
financial market by 2005. Moreover, a Committee of Wise Men under the chairmanship of
Alexandre Lamfalussy made proposals to ease the adaptation of EU financial regulations to
market developments.
  In the meantime, a re-design of the structure for financial supervision has been progressing.
Traditionally designed along the different segments of the financial sector, a clear trend
towards integration has emerged. At the national level, the creation of the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in the UK was a clear signpost, which has been followed in the meantime in
several other countries. At the European level, a debate started with the creation of the
European Central Bank (ECB), which has no powers in the area of financial supervision. This
has given rise to the question of whether home country control can continue to coincide with
growing financial market integration, or whether a different structure will be needed at the
European level.
The debate has recently become more complex. While initiatives have been taken to
strengthen cooperation between supervisors at the European level, both within and across
sectors, it has become clear that a solution for the European context will need to be specific
and tailor-made. This is the case, not only because of sensitivities within the member states
towards too much centralisation, but also because supervision so far has been organised in
different ways by the various member states. The interests of the different parties involved
have to be accommodated. Moreover, Europe’s financial markets remain fragmented and are
at different stages of development.
The main actors in the debate are the national supervisory authorities, the European Central
Bank and the European Commission, the financial institutions and the securities markets. The
issues at stake are the respective roles to be played by the national central banks and the ECB
in financial supervision, integrated versus specialised financial supervision, the continuing
relevance of the home country control principle and the adequacy of supervisory cooperation.
The purpose of this paper is to address the problems connected to reforming the structure of
financial supervision in the EU. Furthermore, it discusses the challenges as perceived from
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the point of view of supervisors as well as those being supervised. After reviewing the current
models and structure of financial supervision and the form of European regulatory and
supervisory cooperation, we address the shortcomings in view of the continuing market
integration and identify possible remedies.
I.  Financial Supervision: Current models and structure
Traditionally, the structure of financial supervision was based on the functional divisions in
the financial services sector. Generally speaking, banks, insurance companies and securities
markets had their own distinct supervisory authorities, operating with varying degrees of
autonomy vis-à-vis the central government (see Table 1). The most homogeneously organised
is the insurance sector, which functions as a separate independent authority in most member
states. The most heterogeneous form is found in the securities markets, where the powers are
spread over single supervisory structures, combined with banking supervision or separately
organised. Moreover, aspects of securities markets supervision are often spread over different
authorities, with important self-regulatory powers left to the stock exchange.
1 Until the early
1990s, banking supervision was largely in the hands of the national central bank, or executed
in close cooperation with it.
In the meantime, the main change has been the gradual erosion of the central banks’
involvement in banking supervision. The predominant view is that central banking is about
maintaining price stability, as was also laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, and that their
involvement in banking supervision may pose a conflict of interest with the price stability
mandate. Finance has also become increasingly complex, with the traditional sectoral borders
of the industry becoming blurred, leading to the view that integrated financial services
authorities may be more appropriate for the job. In these circumstances, the exercise of
banking supervision under the same roof as the central bank was seen as a barrier towards a
more overall integrated supervision of the financial sector as a whole.
The first integrated financial supervisory authorities in Europe were created at the end of the
1980s in the Nordic countries. Norway integrated bank and insurance supervision in 1986,
followed by Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1992. The case receiving the most attention,
however, was the creation of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) in May 1997, which
regrouped seven different financial sector supervisory authorities.
2 The German FSA, the
Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision, was proposed in January 2001 and
formally started in May 2002, although some important exceptions remain, such as leaving
the supervision of securities markets in the hands of the Länder. The German structure will
continue to be decentralised for some time to come, which raises questions about its
                                                
1 The control of brokers and investment funds, securities settlement systems, listing procedures and
securities markets may, in the extreme case, be spread over different authorities, as was until very
recently the case in Germany. For an overview see Lannoo (2001), p. 44.
2 The FSA has rule-making powers and is accountable to the government and Parliament. The Bank of
England remains responsible for ensuring the overall stability of the financial system. The Bank would
be the vehicle for lender-of-last-resort operations, if any, informing the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
with the possibility then of an override by the Treasury. A Memorandum of Understanding between
the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA sets out the respective responsibilities of the different
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operational effectiveness. The FSA in Austria started to function in April 2002. In Belgium
and Ireland, financial supervision will be integrated under the aegis of the central bank.
3
Table 1. Supervisors of banking, securities and insurance in Europe,
Japan and the US (early 2002)
Banking Securities
Markets
Insurance
B B SB SI
DK FSA FSA FSA
DE FSA FSA FSA
EL CB S I
EC B S I
FB / C B S I
IC BS I
I R L C BC BG
L B SB SI
NL CB S I
AU FSA FSA FSA
PC BS I
SF BS BS I
SW FSA FSA FSA
UK FSA FSA FSA
CH BS BS I
CZ CB SI SI
H FSA FSA FSA
N FSA FSA FSA
PL CB S I
SLOE CB S G
USA B/CB S I
J FSA FSA FSA
Notes: CB = central bank, BS = banking and securities supervisor, FSA = single financial
supervisory authority, B = specialised banking supervisor, S = specialised securities
supervisor, I = specialised insurance supervisor, SI = specialised securities and insurance
supervisor, G = government department. The supervision of securities markets is a
generalisation of the most prevalent model in a certain state; it does not take the spread of the
elements of supervision over different authorities into account.
                                                
3 In Ireland, notwithstanding earlier proposals to create a fully independent FSA, the central bank has
been largely successful in retaining powers over financial supervision. The central bank will be
renamed “Central Bank and Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ireland”, and the FSRA will
be established as “a constituent part of the Bank”, albeit with its own Board of Directors, which will
be appointed by the Ministry of Finance. The proposals should be enacted by the middle of 2002. A
similar model was enacted in Belgium.KAREL LANNOO
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The advantages of an integrated financial supervisory authority, as compared to specialist
supervisors, are not clear-cut. Although it may seem obvious that an integrated authority is the
most suitable for responding to the evolution in the financial sector, the first set of questions
that needs to be explored is: What is financial supervision about, and what structure would
best ensure its effective functioning?
Financial supervision is about protecting consumers and ensuring the stability of the financial
system. At first sight, it does not seem too make much difference whether this is done by an
integrated or a specialist supervisory authority. It would be a matter of balancing the
advantages of the different models in view of the policy priorities. A specialist authority can
be better aware of, and more specialised in, the sector and products it supervises. On the other
hand, an integrated supervisory authority may provide for more streamlined supervision and
better oversight of integrated financial groups. A schematic comparison of the main
advantages of both models is given in Table 2.
Table 2. Comparative advantages of the dominant models in financial supervision
Integrated financial supervisor Specialist supervisor
•  One-stop shopping for authorisations,
and (possibly) a single rule book
•  Adapted to evolution in financial sector
towards more complex financial
products and financial conglomerates
•  Eases cooperation between sectoral
supervisors; one lead supervisor or a
single supervisory team for
conglomerates
•  Can reduce regulatory arbitrage and
deliver  regulatory neutrality
•  Pooling of expertise and economies of
scale (certain units could be merged,
e.g. authorisations, support services)
•  Lower supervisory fees
•  More transparent to consumers
•  Lower profile
•  Clearly defined mandate
•  Easier to manage
•  Better adapted to the differences in
risk profiles and nature of the
respective financial businesses (e.g.
retail versus wholesale), clear focus
on objectives and rationale of
regulation
•  Closer to the business (but not
necessarily)
•  Better knowledge of the business,
more specialisation
•  Stimulates inter-agency competition
An integrated authority is seen to generate economies of scale (and probably economies of
scope) in supervision, as well as some practical and political advantages. It offers one-stop
shopping for authorisations of conglomerate financial groups and eliminates any confusion as
to the responsible party for leading supervision and executing final control. Expertise is
pooled and cooperation between the different functional supervisors is guaranteed.
Unnecessary overlaps are avoided and support services such as personnel, administration and
documentation can be merged. An integrated authority should thus lead to lower supervisory
fees, at least in those countries where the financial sector contributes directly to the cost of
supervision, and to a lower cost of supervision in general.SUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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An integrated supervisor will, however, only execute effective supervision if it is more than a
combination of divisions, and if synergies can be exploited. It has been argued that the crucial
factor is not whether all the functional supervisors are under a single roof, but whether they
communicate with each another. This is certainly not a simple task, if one considers that the
British FSA employs about 2,000 persons. If an integrated supervisor is no more than a
combination of banking, insurance and investment business divisions, the full benefits of a
single regulatory authority will not be achieved.
Financial supervision is also about not giving the wrong signals. In this sense an important
argument against an integrated supervisor is its higher profile. A Leviathan supervisor could
create the perception that the whole financial sector is secure. It may reduce the incentives for
providers to prudently manage their businesses, and for users to carefully choose their
financial services’ provider, the so-called “moral hazard” problem. It could also be argued
that the failure of one institution would have more widespread effects in a combined regime,
because the effectiveness of supervision of the whole financial sector would be called into
question.
The advantages of a specialist supervisor are its lower profile and a clearer focus on the
sector, and/or objective of supervision. It can allow for a greater proximity to smaller firms
(on which a single regulator may be less inclined to focus), more specialisation and better
awareness of the problems of the sector. Two arguments are prominent. Firstly, a growing
need for specialisation in supervision and inter-agency competition. Very distinct skills are
required from supervisors, ranging from monitoring potentially dangerous exposures in
increasingly globalised financial markets and validating statistical models in a bank's internal
ratings, to supervising complex financial groups and tracking market behaviour of investment
funds. It is an open question whether a single regulator can do this better than a specialist
supervisor can.
The second argument, the advantage of inter-agency competition, is relevant, although it may,
at first sight, seem difficult to advance in this context. Where several agencies work in
parallel, institutional competition can create incentives for each agency to work efficiently
and concentrate, on core their business, while reducing capture. An example is the US
structure of banking supervision, where banks can be chartered at either state or national
level. In the EU context, regulatory competition between states forms an integral part of the
single market programme. Financial supervision is also part of this, and member states and
financial centres are competing with different regulatory and supervisory models to attract
business. This consideration has also played a role in the creation of the FSA in the UK.
One outcome of the conglomeration trend, and of the undecided debate of single versus
specialised supervisors, is that supervision may become more objective-driven. Since the
functional divisions of the business will be increasingly difficult to make, authorities will look
for other ways to supervise the financial sector efficiently. One possible model calls for one
agency to carry out surveillance separately for systemic stability reasons, a second for
prudential motives, and a third for conduct-of-business. Conduct-of-business supervision
looks after transparency, disclosure, fair and honest practices, and equality of market
participants. The “stability” agency should concentrate on macro-prudential problems, which
affect the conduct of monetary policy or overall financial stability. And the prudential agency
would control the solvency and soundness of individual financial institutions, and enforce
depositor and investor protection.KAREL LANNOO
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Such a horizontal supervisory structure was instituted in Australia, following the Wallis
Committee of Inquiry in 1997. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA)
supervises financial institutions on prudential grounds. The Reserve Bank of Australia looks
after systemic stability and provides liquidity assistance, if needed. The Australian Securities
and Investment Commission (ASIC) controls market integrity and conduct-of-business rules.
Several EU countries have elements of an objective-driven system of supervision, mainly
where the relationship between the banking and the securities supervisor is concerned. In
Italy, for example, banks and securities houses are controlled by the Banca d’Italia on
financial stability and prudential grounds, and by CONSOB for conduct-of-business reasons.
A similar model is to be introduced in the Netherlands in the course of 2002, where conduct
of business supervision for the whole financial sector will come under a newly created
Authority for Financial Markets. At the prudential level the central bank and the insurance
supervisor will integrate supervision for cross-sector activities (see Jonk et al., 2001).
An objective-driven approach points to interesting routes for adaptation of the European
structure of supervision. Rather than emulating one or another sectoral model at European
level, an objective-driven approach may be better adapted to the economic and political
circumstances of European integration. But first we will discuss the current structure of
European supervisory cooperation.
II.  European regulatory and supervisory cooperation
European regulatory and supervisory cooperation is more elaborate than one might initially
think. All EU single passport directives for the financial sector also provide for a structure of
cooperation between national regulators. Moreover, a structure is also in place to discuss
cross-border supervisory issues. Two questions need to be addressed in view of growing
financial market integration: i) the appropriateness of the home country control principle, and
ii) the relevance of the current structure of European regulatory and supervisory cooperation.
A.  The home country control principle
The home country control principle is part of the minimal harmonisation approach of the
Single Market, whereby only essential elements are harmonised to allow markets to integrate.
Additional rules should be adjusted under mutual recognition in a competitive process
between jurisdictions. This raises the issue of regulatory competition, and the degree of
competition that is permissible in an EU context.
So far the home country control principle has functioned fairly well. In response to growing
market integration, a process of further harmonisation can be expected as a result of pressures
from the market and authorities at national and European levels. This will be required to
reduce the remaining powers of the host country in each of the sectors (e.g. the notification
procedure and the general good principle in all the single licence directives, liquidity control
of branches in the 2
nd banking directive, etc.) or to expand harmonisation where it was
insufficient (securities markets). Some of these issues have already been addressed in the
European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan.
But will the home country remain relevant in an EU context? Since major players in the
European market will increasingly have a range of home markets, can the EU as a whole
become the home market? Some large financial groups have thus argued for a single
European regulator for some time. As seen by one of the most important proponents, “there is
a marked trend towards a single European regulator. Following EMU and the single financial
market, the decentralised regulatory model, although by all means successful in the past, isSUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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now weakening the efficiency of supervision and placing its competitive neutrality at risk. A
united European approach would also carry greater weight in international negotiations on
regulatory issues” (Deutsche Bank, 2000). Others have suggested that the single financial
market could follow the two-tier US system of state and federally chartered banks. Large
European banks could thus choose to be federally chartered and be allowed to regard Europe
as a whole as their “home” country (Schoenmaker, 1995).
The discussion above about single versus specialised financial authorities has indicated that
the answer is not so easy. From a supervisory perspective, however, a European FSA would
exacerbate the disadvantages of a single regulator at national level, as discussed above. From
a regulatory point of view, it would be difficult to reconcile with the basic principles of the
Single Market, whereby only essential rules are harmonised and the rest is left to adjust via a
competitive process between jurisdictions. In this sense, it is certainly not proven that a single
authority would improve supervisory efficiency, as it would eliminate this competitive
process. Besides, a single EU supervisor would lead to important legal problems for areas that
have not been fully harmonised at the EU level. Would a European supervised group fall
under the single regulator for some aspects of its business, whereas others would fall under
national law?
It would be also be politically difficult to argue for a single supervisory authority, as it would
have to be proven that financial supervision could be better executed at the federal rather than
the national level, thus leading to a Treaty change to create such a body.
4 Moreover, financial
supervision implies accountability and tax powers for eventual bailouts. While the former
could be dealt with, the latter would be much more difficult and would entail explicit
agreements between member states for burden-sharing or bail-outs. Finally, smaller banks
(and member states) may see a single regulator, and even more a dual framework, as a
competitive distortion.
B.  European supervisory cooperation
If home country control is to remain the basis of financial supervision in the EU, supervisors
will need to ensure that bilateral and European cooperation works. Memoranda of
Understanding provide the underpinning for supervisory cooperation at bilateral level. At
European level, several committees are in place to ensure coordination between regulators and
supervisors.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is a form of agreement between supervisors, which
has no legal force, but sets out the respective tasks and obligations of both parties. In
principle, the EU directives make formal agreements between supervisory authorities of the
member states superfluous, since they make cooperation a legal obligation. In practice,
supervisors have continued to conclude MoUs to clarify what is involved in the supervision of
financial institutions and markets, such as information exchange and mutual assistance,
establishment procedures and on-site examinations. In banking, some 90 bilateral MoUs had
                                                
4 As would be required for a European Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a single banking
regulator or a European FSA. It has been suggested that the ECB might assume the role of a single
banking regulator without a Treaty change, but it should be noted that Art. 105.6 of the EU Treaty
reads: “The Council may (…) confer upon the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of
insurance undertakings”. It only refers to “specific tasks concerning policies”, not to day-to-day
supervision, in which case a Treaty change would also be required.KAREL LANNOO
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been signed between EEA banking supervisors by the end of 1999. Furthermore, there is a
multilateral Protocol to the Insurance Directives, which serves as an MoU. The securities
commissions of the EEA have, in the context of FESCO, also signed a multilateral MoU on
exchange of information for market surveillance purposes.
MoUs raise the question of supervisory methods and the content of information exchange. If
the information that is demanded from financial institutions differs from one member state to
another, the information exchange will be of little use. This will be even more so if it
concerns a financial institution that is active in several member states. From the perspective of
a financial institution, it will not be very attractive either, as they will need to report in
different ways in the EU. The European Commission and national authorities have recently
stepped up their activity in this area. A study is expected to be published soon by the
European Commission on this subject as a first step towards more harmonisation of
supervisory practices.
Despite the importance of information exchange during crisis situations, EU directives do not
impose an obligation to share information in times of crisis. A recent report from the EU’s
Economic and Financial Committee (2001) thus recommended that MoUs be further
developed to make them more specific with respect to crisis management. It was suggested
that this could best be done by the several committees that function at European level to
promote cooperation between regulatory and supervisory authorities. Most of them were
created with the start of European legislation in this area. Their principal tasks are to:
1.  provide a forum for the exchange of views and to act as a sounding board for the
Commission on any proposals for supplements or amendments to legislation;
2.  discuss and adopt technical adaptations to the directives within the perimeters foreseen in
the directives (the “comitology” procedure); and
3.  discuss and compare issues of supervisory technique and to facilitate the exchange of
information and cooperation with respect to problems with individual institutions.
This is, however, a general characterisation, which varies between the different sectors of
financial services. The committees are most developed in banking. The highest number of
committees exists for the securities markets, but with the least powers, at least until the
Lamfalussy report was adopted. A schematic overview is given in Table 3, where we
distinguish between committees dealing with regulatory, supervisory and financial stability
matters. These distinctions are to a certain extent arbitrary, since the tasks of the different
committees are often not particularly clear-cut.
Three committees are in place in the banking sector. The Banking Advisory Committee
(BAC) principally advises the European Commission with regard to policy issues in the
formulation and implementation of EC legislation relating to banking. In addition, according
to the directives, it can agree on technical adaptations to the directives. In order to do this, it
brings together senior supervisory and finance ministry officials. The Groupe de Contact,
which consists only of banking supervisors from the European Economic Area (EEA), has
dealt for nearly 30 years with issues of bank supervisory policy and practice, including the
conduct of comparative studies and facilitating the exchange of information and cooperation
among individual institutions. The Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB brings
together banking supervisors from all the EU countries, and not just the eurozone to discuss
macro-prudential and financial stability issues. It also assists in the preparation of the ECB’s
advice on draft EU and national banking legislation (within the euro area countries), as
specified in Art. 105(4) of the EU Treaty and Art. 25(1) of the ESCB/ECB Statute.SUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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Table 3. The current structure of European supervisory and regulatory cooperation
Objective/
sector
Banking Insurance Securities
markets
Cross-sector
and horizontal
matters
Regulatory Banking
Advisory
Committee
(BAC)
Insurance
Committee (IC)
Securities
Committee
Financial
Services Policy
Group (FSPG)
Mixed
Technical
Group on
Financial
Conglomerates
Supervisory Groupe de
Contact
Conference of
Insurance
Supervisors
Committee of
European
Securities
Regulators
(CESR,
formerly
FESCO)
Cross-Sectoral
Roundtable of
Regulators
Financial
stability
ECB’s Banking
Supervision
Committee
(ESCB plus EU
non-central
bank
supervisors)
Economic and
Financial
Committee
(EFC)
ECB’s BSC
In response to criticism of the lack of macro-prudential oversight in the EU, the ECB has
recently explicitly indicated that its Banking Supervision Committee will also perform that
role (Meister, 2000; EFC, 2001, p. 7). During the Russian crisis in 1998, it appeared that
European banks had large exposures to emerging markets, but no one was monitoring this
from a European perspective. Such a situation could be systemic at eurozone level, as a
financial crisis would rapidly spill over from one market to another via the inter-bank market.
The creation of a European Observatory of Systemic Risk was therefore proposed (ESFRC,
1998).
In insurance, the BAC is broadly paralleled by the Insurance Committee and the Groupe de
Contact by the Conference of Insurance Supervisors.
In the securities field, there was, strictly speaking, no parallel structure until recently to the
legislative committees existing in the banking and insurance field. There were some
committees, but they had only a consultative function, and lacked seniority. A first reaction
was the creation of FESCO in 1997, but this occurred outside the EU framework as anKAREL LANNOO
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intergovernmental consultative body. The Lamfalussy Committee (February 2001) discussed
this situation at length, in the context of the need to adapt legislation rapidly to changing
market circumstances. It proposed a four-level approach as a model for securities market
legislation – which could also be applied to financial services legislation in general –
consisting of:
1.  Framework legislation, which may be directives or regulations under EU law, and is
limited to setting the general principles of legislation.
2.  A new EU Securities Committee, with broad implementing powers, i.e. large
interpretative powers for those elements of the directives or regulations where it has a
mandate.
3.  Strengthened cooperation between national regulators in the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR). This Committee replaced the FESCO (Forum of European
Securities Commissions) structure, and gave it a formal mandate in the EU context.
4.  Stricter enforcement through more cooperation between national regulators and higher use
of infringement procedures by the European Commission.
The Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was formally
adopted on 11 September 2001. It states that CESR will improve coordination among
European securities regulators and advise the European Securities Committee on
implementing measures, while remaining independent from the European Commission. The
creation of the European Securities Committee, on the other hand, gave rise to lengthy
discussions with the European Parliament (EP) on the degree of implementing powers of an
unaccountable Committee. The EP requested a call-back on decisions taken by the Securities
Committee, which the European Commission was unwilling to give for constitutional reasons.
The EP finally agreed with the Securities Committee on 5 February 2002 (almost one year
after the adoption of the Lamfalussy report) on the condition that it would be fully informed
about the decisions taken by the Committee and that it would have sufficient time to make its
wishes heard. The European Parliament’s agreement also depends on a satisfactory solution
being found to the “comitology” issue in the context of the 2004 Intergovernmental
Conference.
From a sectoral perspective, the framework for regulatory and supervisory cooperation in the
financial services sector could be considered as complete since the adoption of the
Lamfalussy report. The structure has also become more complete concerning cross-sectoral
matters. In 1999, a Mixed Technical Group on Financial Conglomerates was created to
discuss cross-sectoral regulatory matters. In response to the recommendations of the Brouwer
report (European Commission, 2000), a Cross-Sectoral Roundtable of Regulators was set
up to promote exchange of information among supervisors. For conglomerates specifically, a
new draft directive on financial conglomerates (April 2001) provides for the mandatory
appointment of one or more supervisory coordinators for any conglomerate that falls within
the scope of the directive. The draft directive lays down the specific tasks of the coordinator
of each financial conglomerate, such as the assessment of the financial situation of the group,
its structure, organisation and internal control systems (Art. 7).
5
                                                
5 Proposal for a directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance
undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate, COM(2001)213 of 24.4.01.SUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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Regulators have also taken initiatives to cover specific areas in the financial sector. In April
2001, the ECB announced the conclusion of a MoU between payment systems overseers and
banking supervisors in the eurozone, because of the financial stability dimension (ECB,
2001c). In October, the ECB also announced joint work with CESR on issues of common
interest in the field of securities clearing and settlement systems, with the intention of
establishing common standards. In a statement on the consolidation of central counter-party
clearing (September 2001), the ECB insisted on the role of the Eurosystem in setting risk
management standards of such systems, because of the systemic dimension. The ECB also
indicated that, for the same reasons, any “domestic” market infrastructure for securities and
derivatives denominated in euro should be located in the euro area.
This overview would be incomplete without a brief mention of the Financial Services Policy
Group (FSPG) and the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), although they are
strictly speaking not part of the fora for financial supervision. The FSPG was set up by
European Commissioner Mario Monti in 1998 as part of the effort to re-launch the internal
market for financial services in the FSAP. Its main purpose is to set the strategic direction for
EU financial services regulation. It brings together finance ministry officials and other high-
level civil servants. The EFC has discussed general macro-prudential and specific financial
market issues in ad-hoc committees, and has made policy recommendations. There is thus
clearly no lack of multilateral fora for regular consultation among the respective authorities of
the EU member states.
III.  Challenges to adequate financial regulation and supervision
Most of the challenges concerning adequate regulation and supervision in the EU have been
on the policy agenda since the start of EMU, or even earlier. They have not become less
pressing in the meantime. They concern better enforcement of rules, the need to open up retail
financial markets and the problem of crisis management in the EU. Some new issues have
emerged. These relate to the functioning of the new “post-Lamfalussy” committee structure,
the implementation of Basel II and the adequate regulation of securities markets.
A.  Better enforcement of rules
Enforcement of EU regulation has for a long time been known to be a problem but was
brought even more to the foreground by the Lamfalussy report. The latter recommended a
fairly complex structure to improve enforcement of rules in securities markets, a structure that
could also be transposed to the other sectors. It consists of the need to split legislation into
framework principles and implementing measures, broader powers for a Committee to
interpret and adapt legislation, the strengthening of cooperation between national regulatory
authorities, and greater reliance upon judicial procedures.
Although the proposals in the Lamfalussy report are welcome, the experience acquired to date
is not sufficient to be conclusive. The first “Lamfalussy-type” proposals” have shown how
difficult the first step is as to distinguishing between framework principles and implementing
measures. Considering that these were framework directives, the draft prospectus and market
abuse directives went into much detail, and this will be even more the case after the
amendments of the European Parliament have been incorporated. As the European Parliament
will not directly have a say in decisions by the Securities Committee, it has proposed many
amendments, over 100 in the case of the draft market abuse directive. Moreover, the EP may
have a different view on what constitutes “framework” and what constitutes “detail” than the
European Commission, as there certainly exists no basic theory on this question. FrameworkKAREL LANNOO
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directives under the Lamfalussy approach can thus be considered as a contradiction in terms.
They were designed to ease regulation and enforcement, but they may end up rendering this
process even more complex.
An issue that is often overlooked is the role that self-regulation and disclosure can play in
enforcement. In retail financial services, the European Commission is encouraging the use of
ombudsmen at national level to ease the resolution of conflicts between providers and
consumers. In the Lamfalussy report, the role of self-regulation was almost absent, although it
plays a very important role in securities markets. Intermediaries, such as investment banks,
law firms and rating agents, compete on the basis of their reputation, which contributes
considerably to improved standards in securities markets regulation. The same applies for
standard-setters such as accounting standards boards and professional federations.
The problem of enforcement will not diminish in the years to come, as the EU intends to
enlarge with 12 new member states, 10 of which may join as early as 2004. Each of the
applicant states needs to have transposed all applicable EU legislation into national law by the
day of entry. Otherwise, the country is obliged to negotiate transition periods until full
application of the legislation is achieved. The applicant states are well advanced in the process
of approximation of laws, but problems with effective enforcement may only appear at a later
stage, and will undoubtedly escalate in an EU of 27.
B.  The need to open-up consumer financial markets
The lack of integration of consumer financial markets is an old problem, whose solution is far
from being achieved. The core of the problem is the difficult interaction of financial market
legislation, which liberalises market access under the control of the home country and
minimal harmonisation of rules, and the consumer protection legislation, which falls largely
under the responsibility of the member states and requires maximum harmonisation to allow
market integration. Consumer protection legislation, however, is so vast that EU attempts to
harmonise will always at some point fall short, thereby allowing a member state to argue that
a product sold on a cross-border basis by a firm from another member state is not in
accordance with domestic rules. The way out of this dilemma is to require each member state
to recognise each other’s systems as equivalents. Furthermore, a sunset clause should be
adopted for the application of host country rules in harmonising measures.
An example of this difficult interaction is the e-commerce directive and the draft distance
selling of financial services directive. The former directive, adopted in 2000 enables on-line
providers to supply services throughout the EU based on the rules of the country from which
the provider effectively carries out his activities – also called the country of origin (not
necessarily the home country).
6 However, the directive excludes financial services contracts
and host country measures that are needed to protect consumers. The applicable rules for the
latter should be defined in the distance selling of financial services directive, on which a
political agreement was reached in September 2001. This directive defines, in much detail, the
information to be supplied to consumers before the conclusion of a contract, the form of a
contract, the financial services covered, the right of withdrawal (with a cooling-off period of
14 to 30 days), and the settlement of disputes. Article 13 of the draft directive states that
member states can impose additional rules on providers from countries where the distance
                                                
6 The country of origin rules have also been proposed for the application of conduct of business rules
in a Communication on the revision of the EU’s investment services directive; see European
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selling directive has not been properly implemented. In practice, this provision overrules the
country of origin rules of the e-commerce directive. Some member states have therefore
called for a clause in the distance selling directive to ensure that, in case of disagreement, the
e-commerce directive rules will apply.
C.  Systemic risk and crisis management
The question of monitoring systemic risk and crisis management has been discussed
frequently since the start of EMU. It is now accepted that there will be some role for the ECB
and the EFC in crisis management, without it being explicitly formalised. Three problems are
prominent: 1) Who monitors? 2) What is the interaction between the eurozone and the EU-15,
or the eurozone with all of Europe? and 3) Who is responsible and who pays?
Monitoring financial stability is, and remains, the responsibility of the national central banks,
not of the ECB, under the EU Treaty. Although there is some coordination of macro-
prudential supervision by the ECB’s Banking Supervision Committee, which also includes
non-eurozone countries, our feeling is still that there is weak monitoring at the centre, and
insufficient oversight of the cross-border dimension.
On the eurozone-EU dimension, the ECB has been more pronounced. Its role is limited to the
eurozone, and the coordination at EU level is weaker than it is at eurozone level. The question
can be raised of whether the risk is also less significant. On central counterparties in securities
clearing, the ECB has clearly indicated that they should be located in the eurozone because of
the systemic dimension (ECB, 2001b). However, the ECB’s role is limited to payment
systems, and it has strictu sensu no responsibility for securities clearing.
Three years after the start of EMU, ambiguity regarding crisis management remains. This
point has been raised by many academic commentators, but also at an official level in the
Brouwer reports. The ambiguity surrounding procedures and responsibilities is not seen as
constructive, as it reduces confidence, accountability, and possibly the effectiveness of crisis
management. The current system is seen as one of ‘improvised cooperation’. If ever a
financial institution fails causing European-wide repercussions, it is likely that supervisors
and national states will disagree over who is responsible and who pays. The second Brouwer
report has attempted to meet these concerns by requesting national supervisory authorities to
add procedures for crisis management to the bilateral Memoranda of Understanding. It also
called for removing remaining legal impediments to the exchange of information among
supervisors. For the remainder, however, ambiguity remains.
D.  The emerging post-Lamfalussy committee structure
The breakthrough on the Lamfalussy approach may have important implications for financial
regulatory processes in the EU. The model could be followed for other sectors of financial
regulation, for example, for the implementation of Basel II, but this may require adaptation to
the existing Banking Advisory Committee (BAC).
The Securities Committee could in some way be considered as an embryonic Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The Committee will have broad decision-making powers, and
will make decisions by qualified majority voting. Decisions in the Committee could thus be in
opposition to the interests of certain member states.
7 The structure of the European SEC will,
                                                
7 The Stockholm European Council (March 2001), while endorsing the Lamfalussy report, stated
explicitly that: “The European Council notes that within the framework of the comitology decision ofKAREL LANNOO
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however, remain de-centralised for some time to come. The Securities Committee will be
chaired by the European Commissioner in charge, but its decisions will be largely prepared by
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), which will work independently
from the European Commission. CESR will have its own secretariat in Paris, and is chaired
by a member state representative. CESR and the European Commission will thus cooperate
and compete at the same time, which should be beneficial for the quality of the regulation and
its enforcement.
An important corollary of the breakthrough on the Lamfalussy approach is that a European
FSA should be off the agenda. The Lamfalussy report stated that in case of no progress on the
proposed approach, a single European Financial Services Authority (FSA) should be
considered. Functional cooperation among member states will most likely be more
appropriate in a European context than a European FSA. An EU FSA would not be adequate
for a host of reasons, most importantly from a financial regulatory perspective. It would also
be difficult to reconcile with the basic single market principles of subsidiarity, minimal
harmonisation and home country control, as discussed above.
E.  Implementation of the Basel Review
The Review of the Basel Capital Accord raises a variety of issues. Within the context of this
paper, the most important are the transposition of Basel II into EU law, the role of the
Banking Advisory Committee for technical adaptations to the directive and the impact of the
Supervisory Review on the non-convergence of supervisory practices in the EU.
Basel II will become a complex EU directive. The level of technical detail in Basel II is high,
which raises the question about the handling of the directive by the European Commission,
the processing of the directive by the European Parliament and the EU Council, and its
implementation into national law. The various interest groups have deeply entrenched
positions vis-à-vis Basel, which predicts a difficult decision process and an uncertain
outcome.
As with the Lamfalussy Committee, it is likely that the Commission will choose a framework
directive that gives a Committee substantial powers. This will most likely become the
Banking Advisory Committee, although this is not certain. The BAC has limited comitology
powers so far, and is not comparable to the composition of the new Securities Committee.
The latter is composed of high-level civil servants from the finance administration of the
member states, whereas the BAC works with the heads of the banking supervisory authorities.
Could this mean that the Securities Committee will be transformed into a form of high-level
finance committee? This is a move that the European Parliament would certainly be loathe to
see transpire.
The convergence of supervisory practices is another priority. However, it is a question of
whether pillar II of the Basel Review, whereby authorities can determine when to intervene
when a bank is in trouble, will be used as an pretext by national authorities to keep
supervisory practices uncoordinated. Finally, regarding the proposal for increased disclosure
under pillar III of the accord, this practice is still irregular in frequency and underdeveloped in
Europe. The number of listed banks issuing half-yearly accounts in the EU is less than half
the number in the US. The production of quarterly accounts by EU banks is almost non-
                                                                                                                                                     
28 June 1999, the Commission has committed itself (…) to avoid going against predominant views
which might emerge within the Council.” The European Parliament on the other hand had to be
satisfied with the promise that the Commission would take “utmost account” of its views.SUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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existent, whereas it is standard in the US (Enria and Vesala, 2001, p. 29). Furthermore,
disclosure raises the problem of differences in accounting conventions, but this should now be
addressed as a result of the move towards International Accounting Standards (IAS).
F.  Adequate regulation and supervision of securities markets
Most of the work remaining concerns the improvement of the regulation and supervision of
EU securities markets and further harmonisation of rules. This is commonly accepted since
the adoption of the Lamfalussy report. Whether the outcome of this exercise will be a more
harmonised and workable regulatory environment is another matter, however, as shown by
the reactions to the new draft directives and the number of amendments proposed by the
European Parliament.
In the supervisory area, a more homogeneous structure at national level may be emerging.
The draft prospectus directive requires member states to de-couple listing from trading, and to
transform the listing authority into an independent supervisory agency, and out of for-profit
exchanges. The market abuse directive requires member states to appoint one competent
independent authority to track insider trading. Both measures should thus ease convergence
among, and cooperation between, supervisory authorities and facilitate market integration.
IV.  Conclusion: A model for Europe?
Great progress has been achieved in creating more cooperation between supervisory
authorities on all levels. The matrix of the structure of European regulatory and supervisory
cooperation has been (almost) completed with the creation of the Securities Committee and
more cross-sector cooperation. The ensuing structure is nevertheless complex, which raises
the question whether gradual change is sufficient, or whether a grand design will at some
stage be needed.
A single European financial supervisory authority is not the solution, however. Apart from the
fundamental problems it would raise from a financial supervisory perspective, it would also
be very difficult to promote politically. A better structure for the future is to re-design the
European financial system based on the objectives of supervision, and to examine where more
centralisation is needed. Beyond any doubt, this is most needed for reasons of financial
stability. The ECB has tacitly stepped up its activity in this field, as recent developments
indicate, but more work may be needed and a higher profile may be desirable. There
nevertheless remain the problem of the desirability of a higher involvement of the ECB in
supervisory matters and the question of eurozone versus the broader EU framework.
At the level of prudential supervision, the structure of cooperation is in place, but much
remains to be done. There is the streamlining of the home country principle, the upgrading of
the memoranda of understanding and the improvement of the mechanisms and quality of
information exchange. The biggest issue, however, is the standardisation of the supervisory
practices in the EU, where work has yet to begin. The outcome of the Basel Review, and in
particular its pillar II, should also indicate how this work will proceed.
At the level of conduct-of-business rules, there is probably the least need for harmonisation,
but at the same time the biggest opportunity for member states to protect national markets
based on various pretexts. A commonly agreed solution for the interaction of market
liberalisation and consumer/investor protection rules at a general level is urgently needed.KAREL LANNOO
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Annex
EU and EEA Fora for Cooperation
in Financial Regulation and Supervision
1.  Banking
A. Banking Advisory Committee (BAC)
•  Established in 1977 by the First Banking Coordination Directive.
•  Threefold role: 1) assists the European Commission in drawing up new proposals for
banking legislation, 2) helps to ensure adequate implementation, and 3) serves as the
“regulatory committee” under the so-called “comitology” procedures for technical
amendments to EC banking legislation. The latter are changes that can be made
outside the normal legislative procedure.
•  Consists of high-level officials from finance ministries, central banks and supervisory
authorities of the member states and from the Commission, with a maximum of three
representatives per national delegation; officials from other EEA countries and the
ECB participate as observers; the chairman of the Groupe de Contact also attends.
•  Chairman is chosen for a three-year period from representatives of member states,
secretarial services are provided by the European Commission.
•  Meets three to four times a year.
•  Discussions are confidential, but a tri-annual report is published by the chairman.
•  When committee acts as “regulatory committee”, it is chaired by the European
Commission.
•  Does not consider specific problems related to individual credit institutions.
B. Groupe de Contact (established 1972)
•  Set up by banking supervisors of EEA member states on a cooperative basis.
•  Deals with micro-prudential cooperation, including information-sharing both in
general and in particular cases, and carries out comparative studies on policies and
techniques of supervision.  It also assembles, as required under the banking directives,
various EEA-wide statistical services including on solvency, profitability and
liquidity.
•  Consists of one official from each banking supervisory authority in the EEA; an
official from the Commission also attends as adviser on legal issues but does not
attend discussions dealing either with individual firms or sensitive supervisory
assessments.
C. Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB (established 1998)
•  Succeeded Subcommittee on Banking Supervision of the European Monetary Institute,
which had originally been created in 1990 as the Banking Supervisory Subcommittee
of the Committee of Governors of the EC Central Banks.
•  Assists the ESCB with regard to policy issues in the area of macro-prudential
supervision, i.e. the stability of financial institutions and markets, and in preparing
ECB opinions on legislation as provided for under the Treaty.KAREL LANNOO
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•  Consists of high-level officials from all central banks and non-central bank supervisory
authorities in member states plus ECB officials; Commission officials participate as
observers.
Duplication of work is avoided through regular informal coordination meetings between chairmen
of each of the three committees dealing with banking supervisory matters.
2.  Securities markets
A. Contact Committee (established 1979)
•  Advisory committee, without comitology role (except for one issue, which was never
touched).
•  Facilitates harmonised implementation and advises the Commission on any supplements
or amendments to the 1979 stock exchange admission, 1980 listing particulars, 1989
prospectus, 1989 insider dealing, 1988 major holdings and forthcoming take-over bids
directives.
•  Allows regular consultation between the member states on these matters.
B. UCITS Contact Committee (established 1985)
•  Advisory committee, with comitology role.
•  Facilitates harmonised implementation of and advises the Commission on any
amendments to the 1985 UCITS directive and its 2002 updates (in which its role was
enhanced).
C. High-Level Committee of Securities Market Supervisors (established 1985)
•  Strategic committee, meets 2 to 3 times a year at the initiative of the European
Commission.
•  No formal legal basis, functioned as Commission working group until the Securities
Committee was formally established by an EU directive.
•  Advises the European Commission on regulatory and supervisory matters.
D. CESR, formerly FESCO (established December 1997)
•  Originates from Informal Group of Chairmen of EU Securities Commissions.
•  Brings together securities commissions of the EU. Functioned originally on an
intergovernmental basis and with delegates from the European Economic Area (the EU,
Iceland and Norway, in the context of the Forum of European Securities Commissions,
FESCO).
•  Aims to enhance the exchange of information between national securities commissions, to
provide the broadest possible mutual assistance to enhance market surveillance and effective
enforcement, to enhance uniform implementation of EU directives and to develop common
regulatory standards in areas that are not harmonised by European directives.
•  Formally established as the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
following the Lamfalussy report. The Charter was adopted on 11 September 2001. It will
function as fully independent Committee with its own secretariat and is chaired by a
member state representative.SUPERVISING THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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E. Securities Committee (established September 2001)
•  High-level committee with implementing powers for elements of directives to be adopted
as further to the Lamfalussy report.
•  Was rejected twice before because of procedural problems and sensitivity of European
Parliament to “comitology”.
•  Relaunched in the Commission’s financial services action plan (May 1999), formal
decision taken in June 2001
•  First meeting under the chairmanship of European Commissioner for Internal Market,
Frits Bolkestein in September 2001.
•  Operational since the approval by the European Parliament of the von Wogau report on 5
February 2002.
3.  Insurance
A. Insurance Committee (established 1992)
•  Assists the European Commission with regard to policy issues in the formulation and
implementation of EC legislation for the insurance sector, consultative role for new
Commission proposals.
•  Consists of high-level officials from finance ministries and supervisory authorities of the
member states plus Commission officials; officials from other EEA countries participate
as observers.
•  Serves as “regulatory committee” under the so-called “comitology” procedures for
technical amendments to EC insurance legislation (life and non-life insurance).
•  Does not consider specific problems related to individual insurance undertakings.
B. Conference of Insurance Supervisory Authorities of the EU (established 1958)
•  Forum for debate among EU supervisors on micro-prudential issues relating to individual
insurance undertakings.
•  Agreed on ‘protocols’, a form of multilateral memorandum of understanding between
insurance supervisors, to deal with supervisory problems.
•  Composed of 15 EU states and 3 EEA countries, with European Commission as observer
(no formal link with EU).
•  Meets twice a year.
4.  Cross-sector fora
A. Commission Mixed Technical Group on Financial Conglomerates
•  Established in 1999, involving representatives of the sectoral regulatory committees.
•  Considers proposals for improving the framework of information sharing between
supervisors and co-ordination of prudential framework on a cross-sectoral and cross-
border basis.
B. Cross-Sectoral Roundtable of Regulators
•  Established in 2001 to discuss cross-sectoral supervisory problems.20
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